Introduction
Labour market institutions (LMI) are widely considered the key determinants of unemployment: "broad movements in unemployment across the OECD can be explained by shifts in labour market institutions" (Nickell et al 2005, 1) . This view, which we will refer to as the mainstream view, has important policy implications. OECD (1994) and IMF (2003) have blamed high and long-lasting unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation, and similar regulations for persistently high unemployment in many European countries and advocated the liberalization and flexibilization of labour markets.
However, this explanation of European unemployment has come under considerable criticism in academic research. Baker et al (2005) find "no meaningful relationship between
[the] OECD measure of labor market deregulation and shifts in the NAIRU" (Baker et al 2005, 107) . Similarly, Baccaro and Rei (2007) conclude that "the claim that it would be possible to reduce unemployment simply by getting rid of labor market rigidities appears unwarranted" (Baccaro and Rei, 2007, 563) . Remarkably, the OECD itself has presented a reassessment of its policy recommendations in its Employment Outlook 2006, which notes that "some European countries appear to achieve equally good employment outcomes with extremely different policy settings" (OECD 2006: 190) . Yet while the Employment Outlook does indeed offer a much more nuanced analysis of labour market institutions compared to earlier publications, it still treats alternative explanations of the evolution of unemployment in a rather cavalier way.
The alternative approach is the Keynesian view, which holds inadequate capital accumulation and/or (closely related) high interest rates responsible for persistently high unemployment. Arestis et al (2007, 145) report "a robust negative relationship between capital accumulation and unemployment." Lawrence Ball, who has performed a careful analysis of the differences between reactions in monetary policy during recessions, concludes that "monetary policy and other determinants of aggregate demand have long-run effects on unemployment" (Ball, 1999, 234) . These and similar studies, however, usually control only for a limited number of LMI.
Investment expenditures are the most volatile component of demand and the empirical literature on investment clearly finds that variations in interest rates explain only a minor part of the variation in investment.
3 While monetary policy exerts some impact on investment decisions, there may be other reasons for private investment to fall below the level necessary for full employment. Indeed, Keynes himself had famously argued that it is mostly driven by animal spirits. To some extent these animal spirits will depend on specific institutional structures and the degree of uncertainty regarding the future evolution of important macroeconomic variables (Carruth et al 2000) or corporate governance structures (Stockhammer 2004b) , but overall it is fair to say that investment expenditures cannot be easily reduced to underlying variables. We thus regard investment as the genuine Keynesian variable in explaining unemployment. 4 This paper aims at filling a gap in the literature. An extensive empirical literature focuses on the role of LMI with attention paid to some macroeconomic shocks, but ignores the potential role of capital accumulation (Baccaro and Rei (2007) and Howell et al (2007) .
On the other hand, the (much smaller) literature on the role of capital accumulation (e.g Arestis et al 2007) usually controls for few if any LMI. This paper thus analyses the role of capital accumulation while controlling for a rich set of LMI based on two different datasets.
Econometrically medium-term unemployment will be explained by capital accumulation, labour market institutions and a number of macroeconomic variables in a panel analysis covering 20 OECD countries. 5-year averages are used as medium-term variables because LMI change slowly and accurate data are often not available on annual basis.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the NAIRU model and recent empirical research on the determinants of unemployment. Section 3 presents the regression equation. Section 4 discusses the data sources and variable definitions. Section 5 summarizes the econometric results. This includes baseline results for both data sets, some findings on interactions of labour market variables, an illustration of the economic impacts of the variables, and a discussion of different measures for capital accumulation. Finally, section 6
summarizes the results and indicates policy conclusions.
expenditures at its very core (Robinson 1956 , Marglin 1984 , Taylor 2004 . Only the latter would thus predict a significant effect of capital accumulation on unemployment in the medium run. 4 As the Manifesto on European unemployment put it: "one reason for (…) the rise in unemployment has been a decline in investment relative to full-capacity output" (Modigliani et al. 1998, 169) .
A review of the literature
The NAIRU model has become the standard reference model in the discussion of (aggregate) unemployment. As the NAIRU theory is well-charted terrain in the literature and the contribution of this paper is of empirical nature, there is no need to rehearse the model in detail. 5 Rather, this section will focus on the empirical literature to highlight how our approach relates to, builds on, and differs from previous research. In contemporary policy debates, the NAIRU theory is often associated with a particular explanation for high levels of unemployment in Europe. Stockhammer (2008) The NAIRU theory, on the other hand, is a general theory that can be given New Keynesian, Post Keynesian, and Marxian interpretations depending on the closures with respect to demand and the assumption regarding NAIRU endogeneity or exogeneity. If the NAIRU is endogenous, there will be a short-run trade off between (the acceleration of) inflation and unemployment, but in the medium run demand may determine actual unemployment and the NAIRU. This is the Keynesian view. It is in this sense that we will use the terms medium-run unemployment and NAIRU interchangeably.
Following Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) the NAIRU is determined by institutions and macroeconomic shocks. The contribution of this paper will be to consider capital accumulation as an additional shock. This is summarized in the following equation:
(1) u N = u(L; MS; K), 5 Carlin and Soskice (2005) as well as Layard, Nickell and Jackman (2005) Labour market institutions, which are expected to shift workers' bargaining position, have received most -and often exclusive -attention in empirical work. Table 1 presents an overview of selected recent studies. As will become clear, the literature on the role of labour market institutions and that on capital accumulation on unemployment have proceeded along independent lines, with the former effectively ignoring the latter. 6 Studies focusing on the effects of LMI typically include institutional variables measuring unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation, union density, the degree of coordination of collective bargaining, and the tax wedge.
The studies differ along several dimensions. One aspect is the extent to which they include macroeconomic control variables. Nickell (1997) and Elmeskov et al (1998) , for instance, include none at all. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) control for real interest rates, total factor productivity shocks, technological labour demand shocks, and terms of trade. Second, while some studies are based on annual data (e.g. IMF 2003 , OECD 2006 , Arestis et al. 2007 others use medium-term data (Nickell 1997 , Blanchard and Wolfers 2000 , Baker et al 2005 .
While the former may suggest greater precision, this is not necessarily the case. LMI typically change only slowly, and accurate data are often not available on annual basis. In this case, estimations based on annual data either have to limit the set of LMI taken into account (Stockhammer 2004a , Arestis et al 2007 or the data have to be interpolated (IMF 2003 , OECD 2006 . Baccaro and Rei (2007) conclude from their extensive tests of different estimation strategies that 5-year averages are preferable to yearly data on econometric grounds because estimations with annual data suffer from autocorrelation problems (presumably due to a lack of annual data for most institutions).
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6 Blanchard (2005) recapitulates the debate centred on the evolution of the NAIRU over the past three decades, while Baker et al (2005) and Baccaro and Rei (2007) offer detailed summaries and comparisons of the more recent empirical literature on the role of LMI. 7 A third difference is the degree to which studies try to control for price push variables. Bassanini and Duval (2006) are basically alone in including a variable for product market regulation. Indeed, the lack of research on the determinants of price (mark-up) setting in the medium run in the context of explaining unemployment is one of the blind spots in the literature. There is of course a rich literature on the cyclical behaviour of the mark-up (see Rotemberg and Woodford 2000 for a survey). Nickell (1997 ) 20 OECD countries (1983 -1994 panel with 2 6-yr-averages) UB, BD, UD, EPL, CBC, TW, ALMP points at interaction between institutions (e.g. UD and COORD) Elmeskov et al (1998 ) 19 OECD countries (1983 -1995 panel (annual) UB, UD, EPL, CBC, TW, ALMP; minimum wages Blanchard and Wolfers (2000 ) 20 OECD countries (1960 -1996 panel with 5-yr-averages, UB, BD, UD, COORD, TW, ALMP; minimum wages
INT, TFPS, TOTS, LDS
highlights interaction of shocks and institutions Bertola et al (2002 ) 20 OECD countries (1960 -1996 other studies find mixed, weak or no effects of LMI. Fitoussi et al. (2000) note "that the institutional reforms in the OECD proposal can only be a small part of the story. In several countries (…) equilibrium unemployment has fallen in the absence of net reform, (…) whereas in others the net reform has apparently not affected equilibrium unemployment significantly" (Fitoussi et al 2000, 257) . Baker et al (2005) attempt to replicate previous findings by means of a panel with 5-year averages and conclude that there is "no meaningful relationship between [the] OECD measure of labor market deregulation and shifts in the NAIRU" (Baker et al 2005, 107) . 1 Bassanini and Duval (2006) employ a newly constructed OECD institutional data set in dynamic panel analysis and find that benefit generosity is the only remaining 'classic' LMI to have a significant effect. The tax wedge and product market regulation impact on aggregate unemployment as well. Baccaro and Rei (2007) offer an extensive attempt to replicate previous estimations employing various econometric estimation techniques and find significant effects of union density among the labour market institutions (as well as of interest rates and central bank independence among the control variables). None of these studies include capital accumulation.
The second vector in equation (2) summarises the impact of adverse macroeconomic shocks. Their effects are transitional unless there is persistence in unemployment, in which case demand shocks, import price shocks, technology shocks and other shocks may affect actual unemployment as well as the NAIRU. The most common explanations for unemployment persistence are insider bargaining, skill-loss in unemployment and queuing (Røed 1997) . Wage demands, in the respective models, depend on a weighted average of current and past unemployment (or long-term unemployment) rather than on current unemployment alone.
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The case for an endogeneity of the NAIRU, however, is broader than a dampening of the unemployment elasticity of wages. First, wage claims themselves may depend on past experience (Skott 2005 , Stockhammer 2008 ). Workers will adapt to certain wage levels if they persist for an extended period due to anchoring effects well-established by experimental economics. More technically, autonomous wage claims will thus depend on past wage levels, independent of (or additionally to) changes in the wage elasticity. Second, a (lasting) rise in the real interest rate may impact on the mark-up as capital costs increase (Hein 2006 ) and consequently affect the NAIRU directly.
Keynesians have long highlighted the role of insufficient capital formation as a cause of unemployment. Three channels through which capital accumulation may affect unemployment and the NAIRU have been distinguished; the first channel presupposes the existence of hysteresis while the other two suggest mechanisms that give rise to hysteresis.
First, capital accumulation may play a role as a demand factor: investment is the most volatile of the macroeconomic aggregates and is considered the driving variable in business cycle theory as well as in growth theory. It is in this sense that Keynes (1936 Keynes ( , 1937 argued that "the level of output and employment as a whole depends on the amount of investment" (Keynes 1937, 221) . Investment, however, will only influence the NAIRU if the latter is endogenous. The second channel is limited substitutability: demonstrates that unless an elasticity of substitution of one is assumed (as in Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991) equilibrium unemployment will depend, among other factors, on the capital stock even in a standard NAIRU model. Thirdly, there is a bargaining effect. Rowthorn (1995) argues that "unemployment reduces the ability of workers to push up wages, while excess capacity limits the ability of firms to raise prices" (Rowthorn 1995, 28) . Thus, an insufficient capital stock will require a higher unemployment rate to equilibrate income claims of workers and employers. These two effects (which are complementary) are both supply-side arguments for unemployment hysteresis.
Several studies have found that interest rates have empirically important effects on unemployment. Based on a regression explaining changes in unemployment between the 1980s and 1990s in 19 OECD countries Fitoussi et al (2000, 259) find that "changes in the domestic (short-term) real rate of interest go hand in hand with changes in average unemployment." Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) present a panel investigation for 20 OECD countries and highlight the interaction of macroeconomic shocks and institutions. They also find strong effects of the evolution of real interest rates. Bassanini and Duval (2006) also find that the long-term real interest rate has a statistically significant impact on unemployment in a panel of 21 OECD countries over the 1982-2003 period.
The empirical literature on the effects of capital accumulation (see Table 1 ) is substantially smaller than that on LMI. Unlike interest rates, capital accumulation is not routinely controlled for in studies that focus on the effects of LMI. Rowthorn (1995) and Alexiou and Pitelis (2003) and support for a role of capital accumulation is found. What this literature shares is that few, if any, LMI are controlled for, which is to some extent to due the fact that time series data is only available for a small number of LMI.
There is no analysis that investigates the role of capital accumulation using a full set of LMI. This is where the contribution of this study lies. We employ the latest OECD dataset on LMI (as well as another dataset) to examine the role of capital accumulation and LMI on unemployment in the medium run. In the panel analysis 5-year-averages will be used because accurate data for many LMI are not available on annual basis. Additionally, this approach has the advantage that 5-year-averages largely smooth out business cycle fluctuations. Its main drawback is that homogeneity of coefficients is imposed across countries. 
Regression specification
The baseline regression equation to be estimated takes the following form:
where LMI, ACCU, and MS stand for labour market institutions, capital accumulation, and macroeconomic shocks, respectively. C stands for other control variables to be specified later that will be included in variations of the basic specification. FE t and FE j are crosssection and period fixed effects, respectively. The precise set of labour market variables varies with the data set, but typically it will include indicators for employment protection legislation, unemployment benefit generosity, union density, the coverage and coordination of collective bargaining, and the tax wedge. All these are wage push variables and, with the exception of bargaining coordination, are expected to have a positive sign.
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Only in one variant will we consider a price-push variable: product market regulation.
This is a shortcoming the present paper shares with the rest of the literature that has studied wage-push variables much more carefully than price-push variables. Product market regulation is expected to have a positive effect on unemployment.
One innovation of this paper is to include the rate of capital accumulation as a macroeconomic shock. As will be shown later (section 6), econometrically it makes little difference whether capital accumulation -that is the rate of growth of the capital stock -is included in the regression or the log of (real) business investment. Capital accumulation is preferred because it has a more straightforward interpretation. Including it, however, may raise concerns of endogeneity: If the estimation were focusing on short-term effects, one could argue that an increase in output will increase accumulation as well as employment.
However, in the long run, employment (and unemployment) is independent of output growth in the orthodox view. Long-term capital accumulation depends on technology (for neoclassical economists) or on expected profitability (for Post Keynesians). Either way, in the context of 5-year-averages capital accumulation is no more endogenous than the interest rate or labour market institutions themselves.
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Data
In our empirical investigation, we include data from 20 OECD countries. 4 Annual data on unemployment rates (u), the real net capital stock of the total economy (the logarithmic growth of which will be denoted as ACCU), and the consumer price index (the logarithmic change of which will be denoted as INFL) are taken from the European Commission's AMECO database.
The LMI data come from two different sources. There are three main advantages of using BGHS rather than the alternative BD70-03.
First, BGHS has substantially more variation in its variables than BD70-03. 9 Second, BGHS also covers the 1960s, thus a longer time period. Third, BGHS includes a series measuring bargaining coordination (COORD), a variable treated unsatisfactorily in the Bassanini and Duval datasets, which have a variable measuring the degree of corporatism (low, medium, or high) that exhibits very little variation across countries over time. As an additional check for robustness, however, all regressions were also performed on the BD70-03 dataset.
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The macro shocks considered likewise vary with the data set employed. BD82-03 as well as BGHS contain a real interest rate (INT) and a terms of trade shock (TOTS; measured as the relative prices of imports 11 ). Both are expected to have a positive effect on unemployment. Furthermore, in BD82-03, a labour demand shock (LDS, supposed to control for biased technological change) and the deviation of total factor productivity from its trend (TFPS) are included. 12 While the former should have a positive effect on unemployment, the TFPS effect should be negative, as higher-than-expected productivity growth allows for (temporarily) lower real wages (Ball and Moffitt 2002) .
Both the institutional and the macro data were transformed into 5-year-averages, yielding five data points for BD82-03 and eight points for the BGHS series. The first and final period of BD82-03 were counted as full periods, and the macro data also cover these reduced periods.
13 9 BD70-03 is not just an extended version of BD82-03, but in parts substantially simplified. While some variables (UB, UD, COORD, TW) as well as all macro shock variables are identical in the two sets, EPL and CBC merely give constant country means with little (EPL: post-1991 period for Finland, Germany, and Sweden) to no variation at all (CBC). Benefit duration is implicitly included in the unemployment benefit generosity measure (see also table A1 in the appendix). 10 The results are documented in Table A2 in the appendix. 11 It would be preferable to call this shock an import price shock rather than a terms of trade shock because import prices are in the numerator of the variable and export prices do not enter. However, as the term 'terms of trade shock' has become established in the literature, we follow convention and also use the term. 12 For some of the observed 20 OECD countries, the series for the latter two shocks (and LDS in particular) feature several missing values that reduce the sample in several of our regressions. 13 Having the macro data cover the full 5-year periods instead (in order to preserve the business-cycle smoothing effect) does not alter the results in any substantial way.
13
Econometric results
This section presents the econometric results. First, the baseline results for the BD82-03 dataset and the BGHS dataset are summarized. Second, possible interactions among LMI and between LMI and MS are investigated, as these have recently received a lot of attention in the literature. Third, the economic impact of the variables is illustrated by means of simulations. Fourth, different measures of capital accumulation are compared. fluctuations. Specification (6) is estimated in difference form as commended by Baccaro and Rei (2007) .
Baseline results
Looking first at the institutional variables in Table 2 , two of them -UD and CBCare statistically significant throughout the different specifications. However, while UD carries the expected (positive) sign, the CBC dummy variable has a negative coefficient, suggesting that a bargaining regime with a higher degree of employees covered by collective bargaining features lower unemployment. This is not in line with standard theory that portrays both UD and CBC as measures for the influence of trade unions on the collective bargaining process.
In a given country, the degree of union membership may be small while the reach of wage bargains negotiated by the same unions is actually large (France being a prime example). Including the difference in inflation rates has no notable effect on the results (specification 5). The coefficient estimate on the change in inflation itself is not statistically significant. It can thus be concluded that the use of 5-year averages has indeed served to smooth out most cyclical fluctuations, and that the 5-year mean of the unemployment rate is a reasonable proxy for the NAIRU.
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Finally, specification (6) estimates the standard regression (3) in difference form. This is the preferred specification of Baccaro and Rei (2007) , who find that other specifications tend to suffer from autocorrelation problems. However, this is not the case with our specifications summarized in Table 2 . The results in difference form are thus reported only for comparability. The exercise confirms our previous findings: Capital accumulation has a strong and statistically significant (at the 1% level) effect with a coefficient estimate of -1,69
that is substantially higher than in 'levels'. Among the labour market institutions, BD, UD and CBC remain statistically significant. 
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The regression results from using the BGHS database (Table 3) are broadly in line with those derived from BD82-03. Contrary to the results for the BD82-03 dataset, however, serious autocorrelation problems plague the regressions (1) through (5). The interpretation will thus focus on specification (6). Among the institutional variables, UD is again the only variable that exerts a statistically significant effect with the expected sign on unemployment.
EPL shows a statistically significant perverse sign. Specification (6) 
Interactions of labour market institutions
Interactions among LMI as well as between LMI and macroeconomic shocks have 
Illustrations of the economic impact
Statistical significance can be a misleading guide in assessing the economic impact of explanatory variables, as a statistically significant coefficient estimate does not necessarily imply that the variable also has an economically significant impact (McCloskey and Ziliak 1996) . To illustrate the economic impact, some simulations and calculations based on the preferred estimation equations, i.e. specification (3) for the BD82-03 dataset and specification (6) for the BGHS dataset, are reported below. 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 
Measures of capital accumulation
In this paper, the rate of capital accumulation has been used as the key variable. One may dispute this choice. First, it could be argued that gross investment is the proper measure if one attributes a substantial role to the demand impulse. Second, one might maintain that it is the size of the capital stock that matters (as a supply-side variable) rather than its growth rate. As discussed in section 2, much of the literature on capital shortage takes this view. To address these concerns, Table 5 reports results from regressions including (log) real gross investment and the (log) real capital stock as explanatory variables. Regarding the first, using actual investment expenditure as a measure for a demand shock is in fact rather straightforward. The main reason for employing capital accumulation rather than log investment was that since it can both rise and fall, accumulation has a more convenient interpretation than real investment, which is strictly increasing in our sample.
Specification (1) in Table 5 lists the results from our preferred specification (specification 3 in Tables 2 and 3) if we include the log of gross fixed capital formation (at constant prices) rather than the growth in the capital stock in the regressions using the BD82-03 series. Compared to the original variant (specification 1), investment as a demand variable performs just as well as capital accumulation, and in fact slightly better in terms of statistical significance. As for institutions, the most notable impact is the PMR variable becoming significant (at the 1% level) upon the inclusion of investment expenditures. With regard to the macro shocks, one noteworthy effect is that the impact of the real interest rate on unemployment, while remaining statistically significant (at the 10% level), is much smaller when investment is incorporated as an explanatory variable instead of capital stock growth.
The second set of alternative regressions includes the (logarithm of) capital stock in levels rather than differences. Such a procedure corresponds to the capital shortage argument, which holds an inadequate capital stock as a supply side variable responsible for medium-run unemployment. The overall message of these findings is that in order to understand the development of unemployment, one has to look primarily at the goods markets (and investment expenditures in particular) and not at the labour market. This is a restatement of the basic Keynesian insight. The straightforward negative policy implication of these findings is that labour market reforms will not cure unemployment. The positive policy implication is to stimulate capital accumulation. However, this is easier said than done as the determinants of investment expenditures are still poorly understood. Aggregate demand is widely considered the prime determinant of investment. Thus economic policy should focus on stimulating aggregate demand and recognise in particular that monetary policy is not neutral with respect to unemployment in the longer run.
Two obvious avenues for future research have been highlighted in this paper. First, there are black spots in the empirical literature when it comes to the role of prices-push (or mark up-push) variables, such as insufficient competition on goods markets, on the NAIRU.
Second, in the light of the scant empirical success in tracing investment back to underlying macro variables, renewed efforts need to go into determining factors that drive business investment expenditures.
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Estimation results with the BD70-03 dataset 23 In the BD70-03 dataset a number of missing values for TW as well as three values for UD have been filled in by applying growth rates derived from the equivalent time series in the Baker et al dataset to the original Bassanini and Duval series. This solution seemed warranted given the high positive correlation between the series for the respective periods. Moreover, the sensitivity of these alterations was checked by running the entire set of regressions using the non-filled series as well. The differences are minor and can be attributed to the concomitant prolongation of the panel sample.
By and large, the results from the BD70-03 dataset parallel the ones derived from BD82-03.
However, autocorrelation appears to be a more serious problem in several specifications of this longer sample, and remains a problem even in the specification in differences. Therefore, crosssection effects were included in the differences specification (6), which essentially amounts to inserting a time trend into the regression. This effectively removed the auto-correlation problem.
The measure for union density again features a positive coefficient, but is substantially less robust compared to the short sample. The degree of collective bargaining coverage, in turn, again exerts a statistically highly significant negative impact on unemployment, which is notable as the respective series is not identical with the one from BD82-03 dataset (cf. data section in the main text). However, this effect is exactly reversed in the difference specification.
Among the macro shocks, only the real long-term interest rate shock exerts a robust unemployment-raising effect throughout all specifications. In specification (3), a 1 percentage point increase in the real interest rate increases unemployment by 0.3 percentage points, in specification (6) it is slightly lower. The other shocks are typically insignificant and more often than not carry the wrong sign, as opposed to the results with the shorter sample.
The capital stock growth variable is once more significant at least at the 5% level with the expected negative sign in all tested specifications. An increase in the rate of capital accumulation by 1% decreases unemployment by 1.44 percentage points in specification (6) (and by 1.19 percentage points in specification 4, which is the one plagued least by autocorrelation among the standard specifications).
Inclusion of (log) capital stock in the regressions in BGHS dataset
The overall results from employing different measures of capital accumulation with the BGHS dataset are roughly similar to those derived with BD82-02. Table A3 documents the same   exercise reported in table 5 in the paper for BD82-03, calculated in differences in order to deal with the autocorrelation problem in this sample. Once more, the use of investment instead of capital stock growth yields satisfactory results. Regarding the capital stock as a supply side variable, the coefficients are significant at the 10%-level, with the exception of the specification including log investment, which again is a result analogous to the one derived from BD82-03. 
